The American withdrawal from Vietnam is widely remembered as an ignominious end to a misguided war — but one with few negative repercussions for the United States and its allies.
By the time these Americans were lifted off a roof in Saigon in 1975 , few American combat forces were left in Vietnam.
Now, in urging Americans to stay the course in Iraq, President Bush is challenging that historical memory.
In reminding Americans that the pullout in 1975 was followed by years of bloody upheaval in Southeast Asia, Mr. Bush argued in a speech on Wednesday that Vietnam’s lessons provide a reason for persevering in Iraq, rather than for leaving any time soon. Mr. Bush in essence accused his war critics of amnesia over the exodus of Vietnamese “boat people” refugees and the mass killings in Cambodia that upended the lives of millions of people.
President Bush is right on the factual record, according to historians. But many of them also quarreled with his drawing analogies from the causes of that turmoil to predict what might happen in Iraq should the United States withdraw.
www.nytimes.com/2007/08/23...istory.html
One problem with the Vietnam analogy is that in Vietnam we were fighting an organized enemy that could conceivably have been defeated by military means. In Iraq, we find our selves in chaos of a civil war between many conflicting forces, most of them native to the country itself, so a purely military victory is impossible, as Gen. Petraeus himself has said.
www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/m...us/index.html
This has not prevented many on the right from claiming that a military victory is imminent:
While the U.S. pursues stability and democracy, our enemies are merrily capitalizing on mayhem to carve out spheres of influence and bleed us dry. The only thing that could conceivably alter their calculations is a change in the balance of power on the ground. That is what Army Gen. David Petraeus is trying to achieve. But he is being undermined by incessant withdrawal demands from home, which are convincing our enemies that they can wait us out. Only if the other side faces the probability of defeat — or at least stalemate — can negotiations produce a durable accord.
www.cfr.org/publication/...am_henry.html
However, Americans have already heard this too often before. Ever since Bush's notorious "Mission Accomplished" speech, we have heard glowing reports of progress in Iraq, most of which eventually proved illusory. George Will: ". . . remember the transfer of sovereignty to Iraq, Iraqi voters' purple fingers, the Iraqi constitution, the killing of Saddam Hussein's sons, the capture of Hussein, the killing of Zarqawi, etc."
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...02.html
Victory is always around the corner, but it never seems to arrive.
George Will further warns that the United States is in danger of the disease which plagued the German Weimar Republic: Rightists claimed that German liberals had lost WW1 by defeatism (the "backstab" theory). This divided the republic into mutually hostile factions and undermined democracy in Germany.
In fact, we already had a bout of the "backstab" disease after the Vietnam War. It is asserted on the right that the war would have been successful if Congress had not cut off aid in the face of a North Vietnamese offensive. Melvin Laird: "The truth about Vietnam that revisionist historians conveniently forget is that the United States had not lost when we withdrew in 1973. In fact, we grabbed defeat from the jaws of victory two years later when Congress cut off the funding for South Vietnam that had allowed it to continue to fight on its own. "
www.foreignaffairs.org/200511...am.html
This is where Bush's analogy breaks down: He blames the fall of Vietnam not on the aid cut-off, but on the withdrawal of troops, that is Nixon's "Vietnamization" plan, which is generally praised by conservatives as a success . . . This was in fact the model for our previous strategy in Iraq:
Our strategy can be summed up this way: As Iraqis stand up, we will stand down, and when our commanders on the ground tell me that Iraqi forces can defend their freedom, our troops will come home with the honor they have earned. (Applause.)
www.whitehouse.gov/news/rel...19-5.html
So, Bush is condemning as defeatist the strategy he himself previously endorsed.
The central problem in Iraq is that the Iraqis have *not* stood up for their country, they have divided into warring militias. It is folly to suppose that the United States can prop up the Iraq state by military force, when the Iraqis themselves have no confidence in it. The difference between Iraq and Vietnam is that the situation in Iraq is worse.
By the time these Americans were lifted off a roof in Saigon in 1975 , few American combat forces were left in Vietnam.
Now, in urging Americans to stay the course in Iraq, President Bush is challenging that historical memory.
In reminding Americans that the pullout in 1975 was followed by years of bloody upheaval in Southeast Asia, Mr. Bush argued in a speech on Wednesday that Vietnam’s lessons provide a reason for persevering in Iraq, rather than for leaving any time soon. Mr. Bush in essence accused his war critics of amnesia over the exodus of Vietnamese “boat people” refugees and the mass killings in Cambodia that upended the lives of millions of people.
President Bush is right on the factual record, according to historians. But many of them also quarreled with his drawing analogies from the causes of that turmoil to predict what might happen in Iraq should the United States withdraw.
www.nytimes.com/2007/08/23...istory.html
One problem with the Vietnam analogy is that in Vietnam we were fighting an organized enemy that could conceivably have been defeated by military means. In Iraq, we find our selves in chaos of a civil war between many conflicting forces, most of them native to the country itself, so a purely military victory is impossible, as Gen. Petraeus himself has said.
www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/m...us/index.html
This has not prevented many on the right from claiming that a military victory is imminent:
While the U.S. pursues stability and democracy, our enemies are merrily capitalizing on mayhem to carve out spheres of influence and bleed us dry. The only thing that could conceivably alter their calculations is a change in the balance of power on the ground. That is what Army Gen. David Petraeus is trying to achieve. But he is being undermined by incessant withdrawal demands from home, which are convincing our enemies that they can wait us out. Only if the other side faces the probability of defeat — or at least stalemate — can negotiations produce a durable accord.
www.cfr.org/publication/...am_henry.html
However, Americans have already heard this too often before. Ever since Bush's notorious "Mission Accomplished" speech, we have heard glowing reports of progress in Iraq, most of which eventually proved illusory. George Will: ". . . remember the transfer of sovereignty to Iraq, Iraqi voters' purple fingers, the Iraqi constitution, the killing of Saddam Hussein's sons, the capture of Hussein, the killing of Zarqawi, etc."
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...02.html
Victory is always around the corner, but it never seems to arrive.
George Will further warns that the United States is in danger of the disease which plagued the German Weimar Republic: Rightists claimed that German liberals had lost WW1 by defeatism (the "backstab" theory). This divided the republic into mutually hostile factions and undermined democracy in Germany.
In fact, we already had a bout of the "backstab" disease after the Vietnam War. It is asserted on the right that the war would have been successful if Congress had not cut off aid in the face of a North Vietnamese offensive. Melvin Laird: "The truth about Vietnam that revisionist historians conveniently forget is that the United States had not lost when we withdrew in 1973. In fact, we grabbed defeat from the jaws of victory two years later when Congress cut off the funding for South Vietnam that had allowed it to continue to fight on its own. "
www.foreignaffairs.org/200511...am.html
This is where Bush's analogy breaks down: He blames the fall of Vietnam not on the aid cut-off, but on the withdrawal of troops, that is Nixon's "Vietnamization" plan, which is generally praised by conservatives as a success . . . This was in fact the model for our previous strategy in Iraq:
Our strategy can be summed up this way: As Iraqis stand up, we will stand down, and when our commanders on the ground tell me that Iraqi forces can defend their freedom, our troops will come home with the honor they have earned. (Applause.)
www.whitehouse.gov/news/rel...19-5.html
So, Bush is condemning as defeatist the strategy he himself previously endorsed.
The central problem in Iraq is that the Iraqis have *not* stood up for their country, they have divided into warring militias. It is folly to suppose that the United States can prop up the Iraq state by military force, when the Iraqis themselves have no confidence in it. The difference between Iraq and Vietnam is that the situation in Iraq is worse.
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